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             The advance in wireless communication and positioning systems has permitted 
development of a large variety of location-based services that, for example, can help 
people easily locate family members or find nearest gas station or restaurant.  As 
location-based services become more and more popular, concerns are growing about the 
misuse of location information by malicious parties. In order to preserve location privacy, 
many efforts have been devoted to preventing service providers from determining users’ 
exact locations. Few works have sought to help users manage their privacy preferences; 
however management of privacy is an important issue in real applications. This work 
developed an easy-to-use location privacy management system. Specifically, it defines a 
succinct yet expressive location privacy policy  constructs that can be easily understood 
by ordinary users. The system provides various policy management functions including 
policy composition, policy conflict detection, and policy recommendation. Policy 
composition allows users to insert and delete policies. Policy conflict detection will 
automatically check conflict among policies whenever there is any change. The policy 
recommendation system will generate recommended policies based on users’ basic 
requirements in order to reduce users’ burden. A system prototype has been implemented 
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                    Advances in wireless communication and positioning systems (e.g., GPS) have 
permitted development of a large variety of location-based services (LBS).  Such services 
may tell users the waiting time for a table in a nearby restaurant, or tell user when friends 
are located within walking distance.  
 As location-based services become more and more popular, concerns are 
increasing about misuse of location information by malicious parties. Since LBS 
providers can now continuously track and transmit a user’s location information, users 
receive LBSs at the expense of sacrificing their location privacy. Location-detection 
devices pose a major privacy threat on its users where it tracks and transmits private 
information. Exposure of location information may put users into the danger of criminal 
behaviors. Kidnappers could take advantage of LBSs to acquire a target’s location 
information. Also, it is possible that your moving device such as cell phones will be 
chocked by junk message from advertisers if there is a bonding of phone numbers and 
location services. Some users will not be willing to disclose location information in 
particular circumstances in particular time. Location privacy has been a major concern 
due to its common use in our daily life. For example, a user may want to know the 
waiting time for a table in a nearby restaurant. User may also wish to be notified when 
friends are located within walking distance. All these applications require an extensive 
use of location data [1]. Many governments and organizations have initiated studies of 
location privacy. For instance, in 1890 US Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis stated 
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that “the right to be left alone” is one of the fundamental rights of a democracy. US 
government has recently initiated a discussion of privacy in connection with the Location 
Privacy Protection Act [2]. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Geoprive 
working group [3] is also studying the requirements of location privacy. In summary, 
location privacy refers to the right of individuals to decide how, when, and for what 
purposes their location information can be disclosed to other parties. The lack of location 
privacy protection can be misused by a malicious party to launch attacks without the 
user’s consent, compromising the user’s personal privacy and security. Serious privacy 
issues must be addressed to satisfy both public concern and the need for compliance with 
current legislation. 
 To decrease the efforts to track an individual’s movements, many location 
privacy protection methods have been proposed. Information privacy concerns have 
mounted globally [4,5]. Issues range from detailed, publicly available satellite imagery 
over collection on the internet to DNA database.  Most of existing efforts focus on 
preventing service providers from knowing users’ exact locations. Privacy could be 
protected in such applications by rendering the data anonymous before sharing it with 
application service providers. An anonymous location dataset provides strong privacy 
protection while allowing sharing with arbitrary data consumers, since no purpose-
binding restricts the data for certain uses. However, this approach requires techniques 
beyond omitting obvious identifiers, since the spatiotemporal characteristics of the data 
allow tracking and re-identification of anonymous vehicles when user density is low. 
Therefore, a common strategy is to use an anonymization agent [6, 7, 8] to distort users’ 
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real locations and send the distorted locations to the service provider. The service 
provider will directly process the distorted data to answer location-based queries. The 
anonymization agent is responsible for converting the query results back to the form that 
the end-users can understand. For example, in [9, 10], the anonymization agent will 
“cloak” users’ locations before sending them to the LBS by providing their location at a 
lower resolution in terms of time and space. In other words, rather than giving a precise 
location and time instant, the agent would report a larger region covered in a time frame. 
K-anonymity has also been used often to measure general privacy [11,12-22]. It requires 
that each user can report his location only when there are more than k-1 other users in the 
same region. These approaches help improve location privacy of end-users.  
            Despite extensive works on protecting users privacy against service providers, 
few works have been done to help users manage their privacy preferences; however 
management of privacy is an important issue to be addressed in real applications. In 
[23,24-29], some simple location privacy policies were suggested to govern who can use 
an individual’s location data under what conditions. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is not a comprehensive system for location privacy policy management.  
This work developed an easy-to-use location privacy management system. Specifically, it 
defines a succinct yet expressive location privacy policy constructs  that can be easily 
understood by ordinary users. The system provides various policy management functions 
including policy composition, policy conflict detection, and policy recommendation. 
Policy composition allows users to insert and delete policies. Policy conflict detection 
will automatically check conflict among policies whenever there is any change. Policy 
recommendation system will generate recommended policies based on users’ basic 
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requirements in order to reduce users’ burden. A system prototype has been implemented 
and evaluated in terms of both efficiency and effectiveness.  
                     Figure 1.1. Illustrates an overview of the proposed location privacy policy 
management (LPPM) system. The system is a policy-based location privacy system. All 
aspect of the system are comprised of small packets of rules, called policies. Its main job 
is to display the location of users to one another. The system is comprised of policies, 
with each type of policy producing its own information, and how that information is 
shared. The main point of the system is to take policies in and using the information that 
the differing type of policy provide, create a report that distinguish what information that 
each of the relation that a person has within the system can see. Policies are set up so that 
their information is reported at specific times of the day, and on specific days. Policies in 
the system can be added, modified and deleted at any time, allowing users a large amount 
of customization. As policies are entered into the system, they are compared to 
established policies; to ensure that they do not conflict. Policies are also compared to 
established policies to determine whether they can be merged together. The user interface 
is set up to be convenient and clear for the user. By evaluating a prototype of the system, 
a baseline of performance for a fully functional system can be established. In other word,  
the prototypes worth can be used to estimate the worth of a working system. The 
evaluation of the prototype of the location privacy system will show the capability of the 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
            Location information has been defined as a set of data associated with an 
individual that describe their location over a period of time [49]. The time resolution and 
location resolution vary with the technology used to collect them. There are several 
methods which have been used to locate the user.  One the earliest system designed for 
location tracking is Global Positioning System ( GPS)  and WLAN (Wireless Local Area 
Network) [50].  
            Most of the time people are not concerned about their location privacy. However, 
they are sensitive to how their location data could be used, and this sensitivity could be 
increased with their awareness of privacy leaks [50].  Kaasinen   made interviews with 55 
people divided into 13 groups from different parts and different backgrounds . The result 
of this evaluation is that users trust current service providers and policy-makers for issues 
related to privacy protection. 
            J. Krumm in his project; he convinced over 250 people from his institution to give 
them two weeks of GPS data recorded in their car. He asked 97 of them whether is it 
possible to share their location data outside their institution, and the result was only 20% 
of them said “no” [51]. 
            Danezis et al. [49] asked 74 undergraduates how much they would have to be paid 
to share a month’s worth of their location data. The average price was 10£, or 20£.  The 
major problem in location privacy may occur during the communication between the user 
and the service provider; while a user is providing information to the SB the attacker may 
take advantage of this location information. Andreas et al [52]. Classify the attack into 
two types first-hand communication where an attacker obtains private information 
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through first-hand communication when an individual unwittingly provides it directly to 
the attacker. Second-hand communication:- attackers relay information from one party to 
another unauthorized party; in this one an individual no longer controls the information. 
            Many efforts have been made to ensure users’ location privacy when they 
enjoying LBSs. The approaches that researchers have proposed can be categorized as 
policy-based, encryption-based, obfuscation-based, and anonymity-based approach. 
2.1. POLICY-BASED APPROACH  
             Privacy policies are legal notices that contain statements defining what service 
providers can do with a user’s personal data. Privacy policies are published by service 
providers, and users decide whether such policies are acceptable to them.  These policies 
address many concepts and specific language is used to define them [23, 30]. Users reach 
an agreement with providers about which data are collected, what these data are used for 
and how they can be distributed to third parties. In this technique, privacy is understood 
as the ability of individuals to decide when, what, and how information about them is 
disclosed to others. Ideally, users can choose among various policies. Therefore, 
depending on the selected policy, users can save some money but, on the other hand, 
providers can distribute/sell some of their data. 
            This approach is easy to use because it not only satisfies user’s personalized 
privacy requirements; but also frees the user from the continuous intervention by the 
system would otherwise require to address specific cases. 
            Smailagic et al.[31] proposed a privacy model and methodology based on the 
context-aware system Portable Help Desk. The privacy of location information is 
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described by set theory and rules. Each rule establishes a list of users who are allowed or 
disallowed to know the location of a user for a given duration of time. A rule establishes 
one time duration and possible repetition of an event. The rule sets authorization based 
on one of four visibilities, Visible to All, Invisible to Some, Visible to Some, and Invisible 
to All. These visibilities are arranged as increasing restrictiveness of the set. Visible to 
All allows anyone to know the location of a client user, Invisible to Some restricts only a 
finite list of users, Visible to Some restricts all users except a finite number of users, and 
Invisible to All restricts everyone. The conclusion shows a distribution where twice as 
many people appear willing to automatically transmit their personal information to any 
user, and a second group chooses greater privacy by rigorous setup of who is allowed to 
inquire of their personal information. Few users choose to grant or deny access to 
information separately for every request. To resolve conflicts between multiple privacy 
rules; if one rule states that user A is authorized to see a client’s location at a given time  
and another rule states the opposite, which rule will take precedence. The researchers 
described such a situation  to the users; they could respond by including “Cannot See” 
meaning the client wishes their information not to be given if a conflict exists, and “Can 
See” meaning the client wishes their information to be given if such a conflict exists. 
            Myles et al. [32] created a unifying location service called Loc-Serv, a 
middleware service that lies between location-based applications and location tracking 
technologies. The primary purpose of LocServ is to unify location tracking technologies 
so that a location-based application can make use of multiple positioning systems. In 
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essence, users of LocServ can specify a location query using any of the symbolic or 
geometric location models that Loc-Serv understands. The system requires a mechanism 
for controlling access to users’ location information without the needs for repeated user 
intervention.  It  employs the same basic concepts used in P3P and pawS, using machine-
readable privacy policies and user preferences to automate the process of deciding 
whether or not a particular piece of location information can be released to a third-party. 
Their approach can reduce the load on the user associated with processing requests for 
their location information. Users can enjoy location services without continuous 
interruptions from the system requesting permission to disclose current location 
information. Also, the authors proposed to define private policies under ubiquitous 
scenarios instead of just establishing simple privacy models for specific fields such as 
business or traffic, as previous researchers had proposed. However, they do not consider 
that collecting user’s decision for various scenarios is itself a heavy load for the user, 
especially in some circumstances when location privacy may not be a great concern to the 
user. 
             Snekkeness  [23] proposed that individuals should be equipped with tools that 
would allow them to formulate their own personal location privacy policies, subject to 
applicable rules and regulations. The author identifies concepts that may be useful when 
formulating such policies. The key concept is related to observation of a located object. 
An observation typically includes the location, the identity of the object, the time the 
observation was made, and the speed of the object. The idea is that the individual should 
be able to adjust the accuracy with which these observations are released, depending on 
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parameters such as the intended use of the information and the identity of the recipient. 
This approach provides fragments of a language for formulating personal location 
privacy policies. The main idea is that there should be established some register at some 
well-known address, that for each located object contains a pointer to the location where 
a personal location privacy policy for that located object is stored. A location provider 
would then be obliged to receive 'release approval' from the policy custodian before any 
location data could be released. Since location privacy is based on some well-known 
address, the user’s location privacy may not be protected when the user is in a private 
location such as residence. The drawback of this approach is that it does not provide 
users with full protection, despite the variance of location. 
             Related research in role-based access control (RBAC) has recently received 
considerable attention, and it can also be used to maintain location privacy. In RBAC, 
permissions are associated with roles; users are assigned appropriate roles, and they 
acquire the granted to such roles’ permissions. This approach greatly simplifies the 
management of permissions. Roles can be created for the various functions of an 
organization, and users can then be assigned to roles based on their responsibilities and 
qualifications. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles can be 
granted new permissions as new applications and systems are incorporated, and 
permissions can be revoked for particular roles as needed. In location privacy we can 
define roles such as supervisor, family, friends and strangers. Each role is assigned with 
different permission to user’s location information depending on the request time and 
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location. In this way, individual’s personal location privacy can be maintained and also 
we don’t have to worry about the large numbers of various policies. However, since it 
role-based access control, a limited number and meaning of roles may not satisfy various 
needs of users for various situations in everyday life. 
            The goal of this approach is to satisfy a user’s personal privacy requirements. In 
order to achieve this goal, a large number of policies are indispensible. As the number of 
users increases, the number of policies may also increase in an exponential manner. This 
makes policy-based approach not as scalable as encryption-based approaches. 
            The overhead of this approach comes from maintaining these policies. A large 
storage space is needed to keep record of individual user’s privacy policy, and each time 
a user acknowledges a request, the server has to check with the policy and then an action 
can be taken according to individual’s policy. This requirement creates enormous 
overhead, especially when users have detailed and complex policies. 
2.2. ANONYMITY APPROACH 
            Anonymity-based approaches are the most sophisticated option in trusted-third-
party-based location privacy. Instead of taking care of policies or users’ identifiers, these 
approaches assume that communications are anonymous. They aim to hide users’ true 
identity with respect to emitted location information. 
            A common way to hide the real location of users from the LBS provider is to use 
the K-anonymity property.  This property addresses the conflict between information loss 
and disclosure risk [13]. 
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            K-anonymity and cloaking approaches have some limitations. First, by design 
cloaking relies on a trusted entity to make users’ locations anonymous. Thus all queries 
should trust this entity during the system’s normal mode of operation. The entity can also 
become a single point of failure; potentially creating a scalability bottle-neck because 
several handshakes must occur between the user and the entity to permit exchange of user 
profiles and anonymity measures. Another limitation of cloaking techniques is that either 
the quality of service or overall system performance decreases significantly as users 
choose to have more strict privacy preferences. For example, if a user requires better K-
anonymity, the system needs to increase K for that user, which would result in a large 
cloaked area and hence less accurate query responses.  Alternatively, if one requires to 
maintain the quality of service; the location server must resolve the spatial query for each 
and every point in the cloaked region and send the entire bulky result to the entity to be 
filtered out. This process clearly affects overall system performance, communication 
bandwidth, and server throughput and results in more sophisticated query processing. 
Finally, the concept of K-anonymity does not work in all scenarios. For example, in a 
less populated area, the size of the extended area can be prohibitively large in order to 
include K-1 other users. 
            Much work that has been based on cloaking can be found in the literature [11, 
33,34]. One of the most recent advances in anonymity-based approaches was proposed in 
[35], which extends an early anonymity-based approach version [33]. This extension 
allows users to define their personal privacy requirements (i.e., the number K of users 
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among whom they wish to be anonymous) and the maximum delay and location 
perturbation they are willing to accept. 
             Another similar method called PrivacyGrid is described in [36]. Although the 
third-party entity described in [35] and the  PrivacyGrid approach are very similar, the 
latter seems to be more efficient due to the cloaking techniques based on grids.  
            Mohamed et al. [37] tackle the privacy problem in a way that protects user 
privacy while keeping the functionality of LBSs. The main idea is to employ a third 
trusted party, called the Location anonymizer, which: (1) receives the exact point location 
from the mobile user, (2) blurs the location point into a cloaked spatial region according 
to certain constraints provided by the user, and (3) sends the cloaked spatial region to the 
location-based database server. Then, the location based database server is equipped with 
special modules that modify its functionality to work on the cloaked spatial region rather 
than on an exact point location. The penalty of having the blurred location information is 
that the location-based database server may not be able to provide a high quality service 
to its users. Users would have the ability to establish a set of parameters to balance the 
amount of information they would like to reveal about their locations and the quality of 
service they obtain from the location-based database server. Those parameters include  1) 
the level of anonymity (k), which users should specify their convenient level of privacy 
by introducing the anonymity parameter k, 2) the minimum area which represents the 
minimum area requirement of the cloaked spatial region, 3) the maximum area which 
represents the maximum area requirement for the cloaked spatial area, and 4) the 
temporal constraints that establish times during which these parameters apply. The 
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disadvantage of this approach is that there is a tradeoff between anonymity and accuracy 
of service. To adjust the accuracy, the user should be aware of different parameters. This 
in fact brings inconvenience in use of location based service if the user wants to find a 
best balance between privacy and accuracy for individual. 
            Gruteser  and Grunwald.  Present middleware architecture and algorithms that can 
be used by a centralized location broker service. The adaptive algorithms adjust the 
resolution of location information along spatial or temporal dimensions to meet specified 
anonymity constraints based on the entities that may be using location services within a 
given area. In their model, the mobile nodes communicate with external services through 
a central anonymity server that is part of the trusted computing base. In an initialization 
phase, the nodes set up an authenticated and encrypted connection with the anonymity 
server. When a mobile node sends position and time information to an external service, 
the anonymity server perturbs the position data according to a cloaking algorithm to 
reduce the re-identification risk. Moreover, the anonymity server acts as a mix-router, 
which randomly reorders messages from several mobile nodes, to prevent an adversary 
from linking ingoing and outgoing messages at the anonymity server. Finally, the 
anonymity server forwards the message to the external service. They consider a subject 
as k-anonymous with respect to location information, if and only if the location 
information presented is indistinguishable from the location information of at least k-1 
other subjects. The key idea underlying the cloaking algorithm is that a given degree of 
anonymity can be maintained by decreasing the accuracy of the spatial data revealed. To 
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this end, the algorithm chooses a sufficiently large area, so that enough other subjects 
inhabit the area to satisfy the anonymity constraint. However, as the size of area increases 
to satisfy k-anonymity, accuracy decreases rapidly. Further, since there is an encrypted 
link between the anonymity server and the user nodes, this approach may also suffer from 
the disadvantages of encryption-based approaches. 
            Beresford and Stajano seek to make location information anonymous. Their 
approach requires that users are able to change pseudonyms repeatedly, even while they 
are being tracked. Users may adopt new applications with which they interact, but if the 
system’s spatial and temporal resolution is sufficiently high, the  applications can without 
difficulty link the old and new pseudonyms. The authors sought to address this problem 
by introducing the mix zone. An application doesn’t receive any location information 
when users are in a mix zone, where identities are “mixed.” Assuming users change to a 
new unused pseudonym whenever they enter a mix zone, applications that see a user 
emerging from the mix zone cannot distinguish that user from any other who was in the 
mix zone at the same time and cannot link people entering the mix zone with those 
leaving it. The infrastructure delays and reorders messages from subscribers within a mix 
zone to confuse observers. The problem with this system is that there must be enough 
subscribers in the mix zone to provide a suitable level of anonymity. In addition, if a mix 
zone has a diameter much larger than the distance the user can cover during one location 
update period, the system might not mix users adequately. 
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            Lin et al. [38] noted that service providers can supply users with the information 
they need, they have to track user movements and location. In this paper they deal with 
such a problem by establishing a framework to protect location privacy. The main idea of 
their system is to forward transformed user location data to the service provider. They 
assume a number of different types of transformations, such as scaling, translation, or 
rotation, to hide user information. They use m numbers of agents interposed between 
users and service providers to implement these transformations, thus avoiding  the 
negative effects of the single agent. For instance, if an enemy hacks one agent, it is still 
unable to track the user. If some agents illegally keep details about consumers, they will 
not be able to discover information about users without colluding with other objects. 
However, the problem with approach might be that the overhead for data transformation 
will increase with the increasing of number of transformation functions. Also this 
approach makes querying more complicated than ever because queries must  be 
transformed in order to get a correct answer. 
            Trusted-agent and anonymity approaches do not scale up with the number of users 
in a system as well as encryption-based approach. This weakness is due to  an 
intermediate layer known as the trusted agent that exists between the user and the service 
provider. The computing capability of this agent is limited; therefore, as the number of 




            Since every time the user gives a request, the trusted agent must satisfy the 
condition of k-anonymity, this involves overhead in processing in order to satisfy this 
condition. More essentially, whenever the users send information to the agent, the agent 
must use some cloaking function to hide the exact information. This will inevitably 
increase the computing load and degrading performance. 
2.3. OBFUSCATION-BASED APPROACH 
             Obfuscation-based techniques are aimed at protecting location privacy by 
degrading the accuracy of the location information while still maintaining an explicit 
association with the real user identity. 
            Several techniques based on obfuscation have been proposed to preserve the 
privacy of users of context-aware services. Suppose that the service is not completely 
trusted by the user; therefore, since he considers his current activity (e.g. meeting 
customers) a sensitive information, whether to allow or deny the access to his precise 
current activity may be unsatisfactory. In fact, denying access to that data would 
determine the impossibility to take advantage of that service, whereas allowing access 
could result in a privacy violation. In this case, the only flexible solution is to obfuscate 
[39] the private data before communicating it to the service provider. Obfuscation 
techniques have been applied in the past to the protection of micro data released from 
databases (e.g., in [40]). 
            Various obfuscation-based techniques to control the release of location 
information have recently proposed (e.g., [41,42,43,44]) based on generalization or 
perturbation of the user’s position. Semantic eWallet [45] is one of the first attempts to 
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support privacy in generic context-aware systems through obfuscation mechanisms. 
Users of the Semantic eWallet may express their preferences about the accuracy of their 
context data based on the requester’s identity and on the context of the request. By 
abstraction, the user can choose to generalize the data provided, or to omit some details 
about it. 
            Other recently proposed obfuscation methods can be found in [43], which 
proposes that the real location of LBS users be replaced by circular areas of variable 
center and radius. One of the most recent proposals for non-collaborative trusted-third-
party-location privacy is Space Twist [44]. This approach determines the point of interest 
closets to the real location, but the LBS provider cannot determine the real location of the 
user. The main advantages of this approach are that it requires no trusted third party or 
collaboration, and it hides the location of the user in a controlled area. However, this 
method is not able to achieve K-anonymity properties due to the lack of collaboration. 
            Obfuscation techniques aimed at location privacy protection. Location 
obfuscation is complementary to anonymity. In particular, rather than making users 
anonymous, obfuscation-based solutions assume the identification of users and introduce 
perturbations into collected locations to decrease their accuracy. Duckham and Kulik [41] 
developed an obfuscation technique to  protect location privacy by artificially inserting 
into measurements some fake points with the same probability as the real user position. 
Their paper proposes a formal framework that provides a mechanism to balance user 
needs for high-quality information services with location privacy. 
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            Obfuscation has several important advantages that complement other privacy 
protection strategies. Obfuscation and anonymity are similar in that both strategies 
attempt to hide data in order to protect privacy. The crucial difference between them is 
that whereas anonymity aims to hide a person’s identity, obfuscation is an explicitly 
spatial approach to location privacy that aims to allow a person’s identity to be revealed. 
Potentially, this combats one of the key limitations of anonymity approaches: the need to 
authenticate users. At the same time, degrading the quality of location information makes 
inferring identity from location more difficult. If flexible enough to be tailored to specific 
user requirements and contexts, obfuscation (unlike regulatory strategies) does not 
require high levels of complex infrastructure and (unlike privacy policies) is less 
vulnerable to inadvertent disclosure of personal information. Unlike many anonymity 
approaches, it is lightweight enough to be used without the need for trusted privacy 
brokers. 
            Obfuscation seeks a balance between the level of privacy of personal information 
and the quality of the LBS. Recent research has indicated that there exist many situations 
in which it is possible to expect high-quality LBSs based on quality positional 
information. Consequently, in situation where the user requires a higher quality of service 
than can be achieved at a user’s minimum acceptable level of privacy, then other privacy 
protection strategies must be relied upon instead. Moreover, obfuscation assumes that the 
individual is able to choose what information about his or her location to reveal to a 
service provider. Although this assumption may be realistic when using client-based or 
network-assisted positioning systems and when sharing location information with a third-
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party location-based service provider, dealing with the entities that administer network-
based positioning systems still requires privacy protection based on regulations. 
2.4. POLICY-BASED ENCRYPTION APPROACH 
            Traditional public key encryption is coarse grained: A sender encrypts a message 
M with respect to a public key, and only the owner of the (unique) secret key associated 
with the public key can decrypt the resulting cipher text and recover the message. These 
straightforward semantics suffice for point-to-point communication, in which encrypted 
data is intended for one particular recipient who is known in advance to the sender. In 
other settings, however, the sender may instead wish to define a policy determining who 
is allowed to recover the encrypted data. For example, classified data might be associated 
with certain keywords to which only certain users have access. 
            One of the first solutions was proposed in [46].The authors propose a form of 
encrypted query processing combining the use of a data structure suited for managing 
spatial information with a cryptographic schema for the secret sharing. On the server 
side, location data are handled through a directed acyclic graph (DAG), whose nodes 
correspond to Voronoi regions obtained by a tessellation of the space. 
            Recently, [47] proposed a cryptographic approach inspired by the private 
information retrieval (PIR) fiel. The service provider builds a Voronoi tessellation 
according to the stored pois, and superimposes on it a regular grid of arbitrary 
granularity. Some of the advantages of this approach are that location data are never 
disclosed; the user’s identity is hidden among identities of all users. However, since 
mobile devices are often characterized by limited computational capability, the query 
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encryption and answer processing performed on the client side have a strong impact on 
service response time, and power consumption.  
            A cryptography system with a single secret or shared key requires users to 
distribute the key securely before they can communicate in private. Such distribution can 
be complex, especially if the number of users is very large.  
            Zhong et al. [48] designed novel protocols to implement location-based services 
for mobile wireless users without using a trusted third party.  One allowed users to 
control which entities can have access to their location information. They identify two 
major types of LBS: The first type of services directly transfers users’ location 
information to authorized entities and that protect the information from unauthorized 
entities, including the service provider itself. The second requires computations that take 
user locations as inputs. The challenge is how to complete these computations without 
revealing user locations. The basic idea of their privacy-preserving design is that only the 
entities in the authorized subset should be able to derive the key to decrypt the location 
information. They have shown that their protocols have low overheads and are suitable 
for personal mobile devices. 
            A policy-based encryption method has the advantage that encryption and access 
control are in one package. Not only would it provides for encryption during 
transmission, but also for storage. Thus ensuring that all sensitive information being 
transmitted is secure. The encryption scheme also allows us to implement access control 
as only those who satisfy the policy can decrypt and have access to the record. There is 
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no need for users to manage their own keys nor is there need to distribute keys. There 
will be no difference for the user experience between the two choices. In both cases, 
users log in and gain access to documents for which they have permission. 
            A common disadvantage of any encryption scheme is that records are stored 
encrypted. The decryption keys must be kept for the lifetime of the record. The 
decryption algorithm must also be available to recover the original documents. In order to 
ensure these are both available, it may be necessary to keep a backup of the keys and 
algorithm. Otherwise, it would be possible to store the records in readable format 
somewhere physically secure and not connected to a network. We would need to store 
backup copies of the records in plaintext regardless of which system were used, due to 
possibility of hardware failure.                                             













3. LOCATION PRIVACY POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
            This section will first present a succinct yet expressive location privacy policy 
language. Then, it will describe the algorithms for policy conflict detection and policy 
composition. Finally, there will be an explanation of  the policy recommendation system.  
3. 1. DEFINTION OF LOCATION PRIVACY POLICY 
            This work particularly focus on location privacy; which can be define as the 
ability to prevent other unauthorized parties from learning one’s current or past location. 
Polices can be broken into three categories: specialized, generalized and exception. The 
three policies interact with one another and the results determine whether a user is visible 
to his relationships or not. Each of the three basic policies work in very much the same 
way, with a few small differences. 
Definition 1: Let U1 be a creator of a policy, let U2 be the target of the policy. Let Pe be 
a policy where e is the type of policy: specialized, generalized, or group privacy. A 
policy will contain the following, a time period Ttime consisting of a period in hours, and 
a range of days; a range of location, Location policy, that can consist of location, city, 
state and country. 
           A few format conditions apply to all three policies. First, the targeted user or 
relationship must be part of the database before a policy is valid; similarly, a user may 
only make policies for people on his relationship list. The logic behind this rule is that if 
the users want to create a policy, they must expect that the policy will be shown. Further,  
if a user allows another user to see him, he must have some form of relationship with that 
other user. Another common condition deals with time; at least 15 minutes must elapse 
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between the start and end time of any of the tree policies. It is assumed that any a 
considerable amount is need for a policy to be valid. Third, location must be fully defined 
for a policy; that is; if a user enters information in the state filed, he must also have 
provided the information for the country line, just as a state must be entered if a city is 
entered and the same for location and city. 
            3.1.1 Specialized Policy. Specialized Policies are the main type of policy; they 
require a connection between the creator of the policy, and the targeted user. Once a 
policy is created for a target, whenever the target requests a list of all visible users during 
the allotted time for the policy; the creator is displayed in the target’s report. Specialized 
policies consist of the creator; the target; the location of the policy, and the time and day 
of the policy. For example, if  the creator wants to let the target to know that he will be at 
the bank on Monday, he simply enters the location (Bank, City, State, and Country), the 
target , the time  (Stime - Etime), and Monday for both start and end date. 
Definition 2: Let U1 be the creator user ,and let U2 be the individual target. Any policy 
created by U1 for U2, P, will contain a period of time Ttime and a range of location 
RangeLocation. During the time period Ttime the range of location RangeLocation will 
be reported to U2 as the location of U1. 





Let U1 be requesting user, Let U2 be owner of Pi 
Let t be time of request 
Let T be the Pi period of time 
Let Rloc be location of Pi 










                  
            3.1.2 Generalized Policy. Generalized Policies, on the other hand, pertain to the 
connection between the creator of the policy and a relationship role. A user can assign 
each of his relationships to one of three roles, each one general enough to include most of 
his associates: family, friends, and colleagues. Each user within a relationship role is 
subject to the policy defined by the user for the role. Like a specialized policy, a 
generalized policy consists of creator, a time period, and location. It differs in that instead 
of identifying a specific user as target, the creator chooses one of the relationship types 
for the policies. Generalized policies also have allowed the user to specify a privacy level 
for the policy. For example, let U1 want to tell his friends that he is at school all this 
week from 7 am to 3 pm. So he creates a group policy with time range of 7:00 to 15:00, 
Monday to Friday, with a range of location of School, Rolla, MO, USA. U1 sends this 
policy to be validated, if no policy conflicts, it will then recommend a privacy level for 
the policy. Because of the average time span and very specific location, as it will be 
described later on group privacy policy. The privacy level of the policy is set to high and 
established in the database. 
Let Si be the ith policy of type Pt whose target is U1 
 
 For each policy in S, i 
  If t is within Si.T 
   Print U2 to screen 





Definition 3: Let U1 be the creator user, let Re be the targeted role where e is a role 
(family, friend, or colleague). Any policy, p, created by U1 for Re, P, will contain a 
period of time Ttime and a range of location RangeLocation. During the time period 
Ttime the range of location RangeLocation will be reported to U2, where U2 is a relation 
of U1 within the category e, as the location of U1. 

















Let U1 be requesting user, Let U2 be owner of Pi 
Let t be time of request 
Let T be the Pi period of time 
Let Rloc be location of Pi 
Let Pt be policy type 
Let Si be the ith policy of type Pt 
 
For each policy in S, i 
 Let Ro be the target role of policy Si 
Let Zj be the jth user in a search of users that reside in Si.U2’s relation list with role 
Ro 
For each user in Z, j 
If U1 equals Zj and t is within Si.T and Z.Privacy Level greater than or equal 
Si.Privacy level 
Let Qn be the nth exception with target U1 and owner is Si.U2 
For each exception in Q, n 
   If t is within Qn.T 
    Ignore 
Else 
Print U2 
    Print Rloc 




           3.1.3 Exception Policy. Exceptions are additions to group policies; they exclude 
a specific user from a group policy. In other words, the policy creator removes his 
location from any reports that would be visible to the targeted user. Exception policies 
are also much like individual policies, however, because their function is to hide 
information from a specific user; they require no location. Exceptions can be set up to 
allow the policy creator to hide his location from specific user for part or all of a group 
policy time period. They also allow the exception policy to overlap two or more policies. 
Going back to the generalized policy, assume that the creator of the policy is shopping for 
a gift for one of his family member, so he may create an exception policy for this 
individual. 
Definition 4: Let U1 be the creator user, and let U2 be the individual target. Any 
exceptions, e, created by U1 for U2, will contain a period of time, Ttime. If U1 has a 
generalized or group privacy definition during the time Ttime, the location of U1 will not 
be reported to U2, regardless of the definition’s targeted role. 
            3.1.4 Group Privacy Policy. This policy differs from the other three in that it is 
three policies in one. This type of policy allows a user to display his location to all users 
that are assigned to a certain role, but to limit the information available to each user in a 
given role based on privacy level. A group privacy policy contains the creator, the 
targeted role, and a time period and location range for each of the three levels of privacy. 
            For example, user1 wants to create a policy to tell all his friends that he will be in 
Montana for the weekend, but he only wants to let his closet friends know what city he 
will be in. So he sets the target role to friend, and enters a time period and location range      
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for each level of privacy.  For close friends, User1 wants his friends to know that from 
Friday to Sunday All day (00:00 – 23:59), that he will be in Helena, Montana, USA. For 
most friends, he only wants them to know that he will be in the state of Montana; 
therefore, he specifies the same time period, but changes location range to Montana, USA. 
Lastly for friends who are only allowed to know that he will be on his way home at 8:00 
am on Monday, he changes the time range to Monday from 5:00 to 8:00 am and the 
location range to Airport, Helena, Montana, USA. 
















Let U1 be requesting user, Let U2 be owner of Pi 
Let t be time of request 
Let T be the Pi period of time 
Let Rloc be location of Pi 
Let Pt be policy type 
Let Si be the ith policy of type Pt 
For each policy in S, i 
 Let Ro be be target role of policy Si 
Let Zj be the jth user in a search of users that reside in Si.U2’s relation list with role 
Ro 
For each user in Z, j 
If U1 equals Zj and t is within Si.T and Zi.Privacy Level equal Si.Privacy level 
Let Qn be the nth exception with target U1 and owner is Si.U2 
For each exception in Q, n 
If t is within Qn.T 
    Ignore 
Else 
    Print U2 







3.2. POLICY CONFLICT DETECTION  
             All forms of conflict deal with similar elements and terms. The basic idea to 
conflict is that User1 cannot be in two places at once; therefore a conflict can occur for 
either time, location, or both. Location levels are based on a location hierarchy, figure 
(2). Location is the most specific level, and country is the least. The location level that 
takes priority depending on the type of interaction. 
             The concept of similar times is tricky because hours must be defined as circular 
time and weekdays as linear. Let Se be the start time for the established policies, Sn be 
the new policy start time, and Ee and En be the established end time and new end time, 
respectively. Two policies have similar times if either the start or end time of the new 
policy is between the established start and end time as shown in Figure 3.1. 
                                                    
                             Figure 3.1 The location hierarchy for the system.                               
 





Two policies also share similar time if the established time period of one is between the 
new time periods as shown in Figure 3.2.  
              Finally, because of the linear timeline, if the established end time is less than the 
established start time, we need to see if either the new start time or the new end time is 
between the established start time and one second before midnight, 23:59:59, or midnight 
00:00:00 and the established end time as shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
                                             
                                             Figure 3.2 Time conflict.  
(Se ≤ Sn ≤ Ee) OR (Se ≤ En ≤ Ee). 
 
 
                                            Figure 3.3 Time conflict.    




                             
                                Figure 3.4 The circular time line conflict. 
(EE ≤ SE) AND ((SE ≤ (SN or EN) ≤ 23 : 59 : 59) OR (00 : 00 : 00 ≤ (SN or EN) ≤ EE)). 
   
            Let Se and Ee be the time period of an established policy, and let Sn and En be 
the time period for new policy. If Se is 3:00 and Ee is 13:00, neither Sn nor En can be 
between the established time nor can the Sn start before Se or the En ended after Ee. If 
one were to enter Sn as 17:00 and En as 16:00, it would conflict with the established time, 
as the time periods overlap 
            3.2.1. Types of Conflict. 
Generalized-to-Specialized Policy  
            Not all generalized and specialized policies conflict. Conflict requires that 
specific conditions must be met. First there must be a similar time and day range. A 
generalized policy will conflict with established specialized policy if it has the same 
location level or higher. Inversely a specialized definition conflicts with an establish 
group if it's location level is the same or lower than the established generalized definition. 
For instance, Let there an established generalized policy by U1 that is a middle level 
policy, and let user have three friends; Uh, Um, and Ul; that have a high, middle, and low 
privacy level respectively. U1 tries to create a policy for each of his friends that overlap 
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in time with the established group policy. Based on our assumption the established 
generalized will conflict with the policy of the high and middle level users, but as Ul 
cannot see the generalized policy, it will not conflict with the generalized policy; like in 
the figure below. However,  if the generalized policy is changed to a low level policy, it 
will conflict with all three users, as all users can see the policy. 
                                           
                                                
Figure 3.5 Conflict between generalized to specialized policy. 











Let Pt be policy type 
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target 
Let T be period of time 
Let Rloc be range of location 
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let Z be pending policy 
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1 
For each policy in S, i 
























            Generalized and exception policies do not conflict because the latter are part of 
the former. In other words, exceptions are used in conjunction with generalized policies 
and must therefore be able to overlap one another.  
Let Pt be policy type 
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target 
Let T be period of time 
Let Rloc be range of location 
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let PL be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let Z be pending policy 
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1 and target role 
is Ro and Privacy level is PL 
For each policy in S, i 
 If Si.T over laps Z.T 
  If Si.Rloc greater than or equal to or Z.Rloc in different location from 
Si.Rloc 




If Si.T over laps Z.T and Ro equals Ro2 






             Another way to think of exceptions is as a subset for any generalized policies that 
occur at the same time. As a subset of the generalized policies as presented in the figure 
below. 
                                    
                                    
Figure 3.6 Overlapping between the generalized and exception policy. 
 
Specialized-to-Exception Policy 
            Because a specialized policy makes a user visible, and exception policies 
effectively do the opposite, any overlap between the two is considered a conflict. A 
User1 cannot request that he be both visible and invisible. 
Group-Privacy-to-Generalized policy 
             A group privacy policy is essentially three group policies connected in a single 
policy. As such, the conflict between a generalized policy and a group privacy policy 
may exist between any of the three group policies individually and the generalized policy. 
  
35 
If any of the times conflict, then both policies are in conflict with one another; see Figure 
3.7. 













Conflict Algorithm Generalized to Group Privacy Policy                                  
Let U1 be the creator, Let U2 be the target 
Let T be the time period 
Let Rloc be the range of location 
Let Z be the Pending Policy 
Let Si be the ith policy of a search of policy type PG owned by U1 with target U2 
For each policy in S, i 
 Let E be Z.PPe 
 If E.T over laps Si.T and E.Privacy Level is less than or equal to Si.Privacy 
Level 
  Notify of conflict 
Let U1 be the creator, Let U2 be the target 
Let T be the time period 
Let Rloc be the range of location 
Let Z be the Pending Policy 
Let Si be the ith policy of a search of policy type PP owned by U1 with target U2 
 
For each policy in S, i 
 Let E be Si.PPe 
 If Z.T over laps E.T and Z.Privacy Level is greater than or equal to Si. 
Privacy Level 





                                   
Figure 3.7 Conflict between the generalized and group privacy policy. 
 
Group Privacy-to-Exception 
            Exception policies interact with group privacy policies  in much the same way as 
they interact with group policies. Exceptions cannot conflict with group privacy policies 
because they are used with such parties. 
Group-Privacy-to-specialized 
            Unlike generalized definition, specialized definitions will not conflict with an 
entire Group Privacy definition, but with the individual policy that corresponds to the 
target user’s privacy level. Take for instance, that the example described for group 
privacy definition was enacted. If the creator of the group privacy policy, User1, wanted 
to create an individual policy for a low privacy level friend at 4:30 am – 5:30 am Monday 
for the Hotel Lobby, the new individual policy would conflict with the lower level of the 
group privacy policy, but if the day of the week were to be changed to Sunday, which 
would conflict the middle and high level parts of the policy. However, even if we made 
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this change as the targeted friend is a low level user, the two policies do not conflict, and 
the policy is allowed to be established as shown in Figure 3.8.  
                                                                                           
Figure 3.8 Conflict between Group-Privacy and specialized.  









Let Pt be policy type 
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target 
Let T be period of time 
Let Rloc be range of location 
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let PL be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let Z be pending policy 
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1 
For each policy in S, i 
 Let Ro2 be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target Si.U2 
 Let PL2 be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target 
Si.U2 
 If Si.T over laps Z.T and Ro equals Ro2 and PL2 equals PL 
  If Si.Rloc less than or equal to or Z.Rloc in different location from 
Si.Rloc 





















            3.2.2 Outline of Policy Conflict Detection Algorithm. When checking for the 
location of other users, the system first differentiates between the three types of visible 
definitions. The tables for each type of policy are requested individually from the 
database. Policies are separated by the targeted users and roles, after separating the 
policies, they are selected by whether the selected user is within the group of the current 
policy. The policies are then selected if they are within the time of the policies are 
selected. Finally, the policies are compared to established exceptions, if they conflict, 
then the conflicting policy is not retrieved. 
Let Pt be policy type 
Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be target 
Let T be period of time 
Let Rloc be range of location 
Let Ro be role type as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let PL be privacy level as found by search of relation list of U1 for target U2 
Let Z be pending policy 
Let Si be the ith policy in a search of policy type Pt whose owner is U1 and target role 
is Ro and Privacy level is PL 
For each policy in S, i 
 If Si.T over laps Z.T 
  If Si.Rloc greater than or equal to or Z.Rloc in different location from 
Si.Rloc 
   Notify of conflict 
Loop 
Notify of conflict clear 
 
    




3.3. POLICY COMPOSITION  
            3.3.1. Policy Insertion. To insert a policy into the system is to create a new 
policy to be inserted into the database. This is the most used function of the program, to 
be able to add new policies. Policies are first submitted, then are checked for validity, 
then are checked against established policies to confirm or deny conflicts and then lastly 
if the policy is valid, it is inserted into the database. 
            3.3.2. Policy Modification. Modify polices is more or less altering established 
policies in accordance to conflict conditions. Much like inserting the user resubmits the 
policies, which in turn is check for validity, compared to other established policy, and 
finally reemitted to the database. 
            3.3.3. Policy Deletion. Deleting a policy is straight forward. When a policy is 
requested to be deleted, the policy is first checked if it has multiple definitions, that is to 
say multiple time periods. If there does exists multiple definitions, only the requested 
definition is to be deleted, on the other hand if there is only one definition, the entire 
policy is deleted. 
            3.3.4 Merging Policies. When an established policy is merged with a new policy, 
the new time range of the policy is added to the existing policy, allowing a policy to be 
enacted at multiple times. The standard conditions for such actions are simple: The two 
polices must share a targeted user, creator, and location, and they must not overlap in 
time. There are added conditions, however, for each of the four policy definitions. For 
specialized and generalized definitions, there are no added conditions if the above 
conditions are satisfied and the creator wishes to merge the policy, they will merge. 
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Exceptions have no merging conditions as exceptions cannot be merged as they have no 
information to show to a user. Group Privacy definitions are a little different, for merging 
to be possible for a group privacy policy, the above conditions must be held true for all 
three policies. 














3.4. POLICY RECOMMENDATION SYSTEM 
            The policy recommendation system will generate recommended policies based on 
users’ basic requirements in order to reduce users’ burden. In what follows, we first 
define a concept of privacy level and then present our recommendation algorithm.  
Let Pt be policy type 
Let U1 be creator of policy, Let U2 be target 
Let T be period of Time 
Let Rloc be range of location 
Let Z be pending policy 
Let Si be the i
th
 policy from a search of policies of type Pt with creator U1 
 
For each policy in S, i 
If Z.Rloc equals Si.Rloc and Z.T does not overlap Si.T 
 Request for merge 
 If request is accepted 
  Create merge policy 
 Else 
 Clear Z 
  Loop to beginning 
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            3.4.1 Definition of Policy Privacy Levels. When a user creates a new group 
policy, they are recommended a privacy level for said policy. This privacy level dictates 
which categories of relations in a role are allowed to see the policy. Visibility is based on 
a level hierarchy, with High privacy at the top and Low privacy at the bottom. Any user 
at the group policy’s privacy level or high can see the policy, that is low level policy can 
be view by all three level, high and middle level friends can see middle level policy and 
only high level friends can see high level policies. Privacy levels for group policies are 
based on a calculated number, which is created from an algorithm based on the range of 
location and period of time. The user designates in a separate window the location weight, 
that is to say what location level policy weight is, like making the weight of City level 
policy to be 15 and Location level to 0. The default weight for each location level 0 for 
location, 20 for City, 55 for state and 90 for country, as each is more generalized then the 
next. The Location weight is subtracted from the time weight, which can be between 0 
and 100 to calculate the privacy level, as show below: 
 
 
Stime is the start time for a policy hours. 
Etime is the end time for a policy hours. 
Sday Start time for a policy day and Eday the end time for a policy day. Where the time 
line for the day start at Saturday=6, and end at Sunday=0. 
            The formula for time is set up so that is follows a Cartesian path similar to y= √x 
where y is the difference in time, and x is the difference in days. But the ratio between the 
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two differences must equal one when they are at their maximums, that is to say 23= 7
1/x
 
and solving for x leads to x equal to .613. The ratio is then times 100 to turn the decimal 
into a percentage. After finding the privacy weight, if the weight falls between the cut off 
points for the three levels of privacy, that level of privacy is recommended. If the weight 
falls between 100 and 71it is a high level, if it between 70 and 24 it’s middle and 
anything 23 or lower is a low level policy. 
            The cut off points are based on policy disturbed and the weights of generic 
scenarios of policies. For example a generic low level policy is 4 hours and 4 days and a 
state level policy, so its weight is  (4
.613
/ (7-3)) * 100 – 55 ≈ 3, and a generic middle level 
is 8 hours, one day, and a city level policy weight is (8
.613
/ (7-0)) * 100 – 20 ≈ 31. But we 
also want to have the policy distributed so that a majority of them are low level policies, 
and that there are more middle level policies then high level. As such the middle level 
range needs to be expanded so that the percent distribution is 62.5% low policies, 23% 
middle policies, and 14.5% high level polices. 
            The default location weights for the four level of location; location, city, state and 
country; were decided based on estimates and less on a mathematical project. The weight 
for each location level does not need to be very exact, as the defaults are only to be used 
as a suggestion. As such the estimation are pretty loose location being zero as it needs to 
be the lightest and country needs to be the heaviest, so make things much simpler, the 
default is 100. As state level should be about between the location and country location 
add much closer to country, so making state level fifty-five leads to be closer to the 
country level and be about the middle of the spectrum. Lastly the city level must be 
between the state level of fifty-five and the location level of zero, and be closer to the 
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lighter location level, so I estimated the city level to have a weight of twenty. The reason 
for the large gap between the city and state is because there is a large difference between 
a city area and a state area, as such there should be a large gap between the two location 
levels. 
            3.4.2 Policy Recommendation Algorithm. The policy recommendation works as 
follows. Whenever a policy is inserted into the system, its privacy level will be computed 
and stored. Then, when a user would like to compose a new policy, the user can tell the 
system that what kind of policy that he wants. For example, the user can indicate that he 
would like to assign a medium level privacy policy to his new friend Bob. Upon the 
user’s request, the system will search the existing policies and find the policies with 
medium privacy level. Among the retrieved policies, the policy which contains similar 
role of Bob will be returned to the user as a recommended policy. The user can either 
accept the recommended policy as it is or modify the policy. In this way, users no longer 










Let U1 be creator, Let U2 be targeted role 
Let TS be starting hour, Let TE be ending hour 
Let DS be starting day, Let DE be ending day 
Let Rloc be range of location 
Let S be policy in weight table with owner U1 and target role U2 
For each element in S that matches range of Rloc, E 
 Let location weight equal to E 
 Let Time weight equal to (|T_S-T_E |^.613/(|D_S-D_E |+1))*10 








                                                      
                                                 
                                       
 
 
















 If Privacy greater then 70 
  Recommend High level in dialog box 
 Else If Privacy greater then 21 
  Recommend Middle level in dialog box 
 Else 
Recommend Low level in dialog box 






            The system model was implemented using Microsoft Access, this choice ensure 
ease of access, but leads to sacrifices some security features. The maximum file size of 
an Access database file is two gigabytes. In addition to a maximum size, there are also a 
maximum number of objects that can be within a database file within a given time. 
32,768 objects can be part of the database as at any time. Lastly is the capacity of users 
that can be concurrently on the stream which is 255, but like file size one can split 
database across a distributed network of databases, effectively raising the cap on 
concurrent users. 
 The system was implemented based on two languages: Visual Basic and SQL. 
 Visual Basic: As this experiment called for simply a model to test with, visual 
basic was an acceptable language to program end. By using visual basic we could create 
the need input and windows for the program without extra work, allowing more time for  
the internals of the program. Visual basic allowed me to quickly mock up the interface, 
and then add the needed underling code quickly and concisely. Visual Basic was also 
considered because I have had the experience needed to connect the user interface to the 
background database in SQL. 
 Visual Basic’s function in the program was for the most part for the user 
interface. The interfaced needed to be simple, user friendly, and able to work correctly. 
The interface desired to guide a user to the proper policy and display the policies that user 
has already created. Visual Basic other function was to communicate with the database 
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using SQL and using the data giving to back to visual basic, evaluate whether a policy 
conflicts with established policies. 
 Structured Query Language: SQL was planned to be used from the beginning to 
be used in the project as it is optimized for select statements and for creating and 
modifying both tables and tuples in the database used. Microsoft Access SQL was 
selected for ease of use. Although difficult to secure and not recommended for a 
complete system. It was adequate for this experiment, and it offered the added benefit of 
a graphical user interface, so that a table and database can be created easily and one can 
modify tuples quite quickly. 
 The primary function of SQL in the project was to run the database 
communications sent by Visual Basic. Because SQL is optimized for selecting tuples 
from tables using varying forms of condition, it is very vital to the functioning of conflict 
algorithms, as the conflict are very specific and among the four types of policies and their 
interaction with one another. 
 The following discussion evaluates the system in terms of both effectiveness and 
efficiency.  
4.1 EFFECTIVENESS  
  The user interface was designed to be convenient and simple for the user. All 
user functions were set up to be in one place so that a user can easily maneuver to want 
they wish to do quickly. All the functions are grouped together in terms of what they 




             4.1.1 Main Window. The main window works as a hub for all processes the user 
wishes to do, it contains access to adding, modifying, and deleting both policies and 
relationships. The status window displays the user’s name and the large area within the 
window, displays policies that the logged in users has in the system, displaying the 
targeted role or user, the location, and the start/end time of the policy, as shown in Figure 
4.1. If a user wishes to see where other users are, he must click the See Relations button 
to bring up the visible relationship list. Exceptions are separated from the three other 
types of policy definition for clarity, and by clicking the exception window brings up a 
separate window that allows the users to add, delete and modify exceptions. 
 
                    
 




            4.1.2 Adding Specialized or Generalized Policy. Clicking the Add Policy brings 
up a second window, and enter the user’s ID into the first text box.  The second row 
contains a dropdown box, this contain a list of all users with individual’s relationship list. 
This makes it convenient for the individual to target a user, without having to remember 
the targeted user’s ID.  Figure 4.2 illustrates the range of location is separated into 
textboxes to better clarify what is to be entered. The start time and end time portion is 
done as a pair of numerical up and down, allowing the user to select time. Lastly the 
weekday appears as a drop down window for easy selection.  The Adding group policies  
does not differ much from individual policy, except rather than a target user, there is a 
targeted role. 
 
                   
Figure 4.2 Adding specialized and generalized policy. 
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            4.1.3 Adding Group Privacy Policies. Clicking the Privacy Policy button lead to 
the group privacy policy; see Figure 4.3. Like group and individual policy the policy 
starts with the creator’s ID and a targeted role, but the elements contain change from here. 
Three buttons below the target role, these are the separate policy for each privacy level. 
The user clicks and input each level sparely clicking add, to close the window. After 
adding information for each level, clicking add in the main window to adds this policy to 
the user’s policies. Before adding the policy to the database the system recommends a 
privacy level for the policy bring up a window with the recommend level and three 
button one for each of the level. After choosing the desired level, the policy is finally set 
into the database. 
 
                        
                             
Figure 4.3 Adding group privacy policy. 
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            4.1.4 Modifying Policies. By selecting an established policy then clicking Modify 
Policy, this bring up the modify policy window. Each window looks much like it 
respective add policy, except that the input boxes are filled with the previously entered 
input as shown in Figure 4.4. Changing any information within this window will change 
the information of the established policy. 
 
                 
Figure 4.4 Modifying policy. 
 
            4.1.5 Deleting Policies. Deleting is very simple, first highlighting the established 
policy and clicks Removing Policy. This will bring up a confirmation dialog box, clicking 
yes will delete the established policy, while clicking no will return the user to the main 
status window. After clicking yes the main policy window will repopulate, showing that 
the policy has been deleted. 
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            4.1.6. Exception Window. Clicking the exception window brings up the 
exception status window. The exception is separated from the other three policies to 
clarify the distinction between them. Aside from the separation, there is no really 
difference in appearance. This window contains the options for exceptions: adding, 
modifying, and deleting. When bringing up the window it populates with established 
exceptions. Like the main window the large area in the middle of the exception window, 
this is the policy window. This area displays established exceptions showing the policy’s 
ID, the user that exception targets and the starting and ending time of the exception. 
Closing the window brings the main status window as illustrated in Figure 4.5. 
 
                               




            4.1.7 Relationship Feature. The relationship functions are not important part of 
the system but are needed for policy definitions. The relationship list displays the user’s 
relations and what role they are part of. Adding, modifying and deleting friend is much 
like how it is done with policy definition; see Figure 4.6. 
 
                      
Figure 4.6 Relationship window. 
 
4.2. EFFICIENCY 
 As the time for an action is based on the speed of Visual Basic, SQL, the speed of 
the connection and many other varying factors, a fixed measurement of time cannot be 
acquired. As such, estimating the time complexity in the big O notation should yield a 
useful measurement of time. Before talking more in-depth on the main function’s time 
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complexity, there are a few facts that need to be established first. For one is the 
complexity of basic functions of SQL, insert and select. 
            Selecting a tuple or tuples from a table can have one of two complexities, based 
on whether or not the database is indexed. If a table is set up to be indexed by it primary 
number key, its complexity is of order O(log(n)), on the other hand if the table is not 
indexed its complexity becomes of order O(n). As for inserting into a database, an 
indexed database has an insertion complexity of O(log(n2)), because the table must be 
searched and the tuple to be inserted must be evaluated on where to place it. On the other 
hand with an unindexed table needs only to add the new tuple to the end of the table, 
making the complexity O(1). Secondly is the type of database to be used, which is to say 
whether the database is to be indexed or unindexed. While an indexed database lowers 
the time spent when selecting information from tables, its insertion time is much higher 
than that of the unindexed insertion. For this reason the model is unindexed.  
  Estimating the time complexity of the model is based off the main action of the 
system: conflict analysis, viewing other user’s policies, and finally checking for your own 
policies. We do not need to estimate all tasks, as big O notation estimates are based on 
the most important aspects of the systems. The first major action the user will come 
across is the checking and displaying policies. This is the simplest major action of the 
system, as it only is doing a condition select statement. Because it is just a conditional 
select statement, the complexity of the statement is simply O(n). There are three tables to 
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check when looking for all policies, individual policies, group policies, and group privacy 
policy. As such because there are three checks and the base complexity becomes O(3n). 
 Next is finding visible users. This is a complex action, as each of the three 
visibility policies has its own complexity. The individual policy is a straight forward 
selection, making it of O(n). The group policy is of order O(nm). This is because how 
group policy is searched for. Let n be the number of policies in the group policies tables, 
and let m be the number of people in the relationship table. For each group policy, n, the 
entire relationship m must be checked, making the complexity, O(nm). Group privacy 
policy is much like group policy except it is essentially three group policies. Thus each 
group privacy policies, must be checked three times, one for each sub policy, making its 
complexity O((3n)m). Combining the complexities boors O((3m+1)nm + n), and 
dropping the n to simplify the order, we estimate the complexity to be O((3m+1)nm). The 
last major action is conflict analysis. Conflict check varies among the four policy 
definitions. The average number of checks for each policy is approximately three. Each 








                                                          5. CONCLUSION 
            This thesis, presents a location privacy policy management system. It has three 
main functions. First, it helps compose location privacy policies for users who subscribe 
to location-based services. Second, it automatically detects policy conflict whenever there 
is a policy update. In this way, policy management becomes an easy task for users. 
Thirdly, it also provides an important feature, which is the policy recommendations. 
Users do not need to compose new policies for every new friend. Instead, the system will 
generate recommended policies based on existing privacy policies on the similar group of 
users. In all, the ultimate goal of our proposed system is to ease the burden on end users; 
when managing their privacy preferences so that they can fully enjoy the benefits of 
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